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Moral Development Theories: 
Controversy, Bias, and 
a New Perspective 
by 
Julie Ann Robinson, Honors Program 
Utah State University, 1989 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Kent E. Robson 
Department: Languages and Philosophy 
This thesis examines the well-established Kohlberg 
hierarchical model of moral development and allegations of bias 
within the model. The Cognitive-Development approach to moral 
development, the Kohlberg model, and a counter-model proposed by 
Carol Gilligan are presented. The interview methodology commonly 
used by moral development researchers as well as the 
applicability of interview data to actual moral decision-making 
is questioned. A web model that includes the interactions of 
culture and education in moral modifications is presented as an 
original alternative to the step-wise models currently in use 
iii 
INTRODUCTION 
To researchers in developmental psychology, abstract ethics 
take on a more pragmatic perspective. Since ethics are directly 
related to thinking in general, the development of morality 
within the individual is of great interest to developmental 
psychologists. Almost everyone recognizes the existence of moral 
sense. However, the concept is subjective, and hence very 
difficult to define, interpret or measure. 
In two decades of research, Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard 
has developed a complex system for quantifying progress in moral 
development. Kohlberg's model views moral development as an 
increasing ability to use abstract justice principles to weigh 
values in solving hypothetical moral dilemmas. He measures the 
moral development of a given subject by how well the subject 
e xpr e sses a comparison of rights when discussing hypothetical 
moral dilemmas. 
One prominent critic of Kohlberg's theory is his former 
collaborator, Carol Gilligan. Gilligan claims sex-bias in 
Kohlberg's work and suggests an entirely separate criterion for 
gauging moral "progress." She claims that some persons 
(especially the women she has studied) use the criteria of 
relationship and caring instead of justice in solving moral 
dilemmas and that this different orientation is not evidence of 
inferiority as indicated by the Kohlberg model. The widespread 
use of the Kohlberg model in education and rehabilitation 
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research gives a special importance to Gilligan's critique--the 
unwitting propagation of a sex-bias is not only unscientific but 
also could have negative effects on society. For example, the 
Kohlberg model has been used in attempts to instill justice-
oriented moral values in students at a reform school (Higgins et 
al., 1984). Bias within the model could invalidate rather than 
build upon the previous moral perspectives of students at the 
school leading to moral confusion or reduced self-esteem. Thus, 
the question of sex-bias in Kohlberg's model is one of great 
importance. 
Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories are a part of a broader 
psychological school of thought with its own set of philosophical 
overtones. Because their work comes from a single "cognitive-
developmental structural" perspective, it is important to examine 
the effect of these assumptions on their theories. It is equally 
important to critique the methodologies utilized in order to 
ascertain that the theories are empirically valid. 
Behind the particular psychological perspective of Kohlberg 
and Gilligan lies an even deeper cultural tradition. Their 
methods are based in the language usage of the subjects and so 
the theories constructed from this data reflect their own 
understanding of the words used by the subjects. This language 
is a function of culture. If a moral development theory is to be 
applied universally, it is desirable to make it as objective as 
possible. To have a truly objective developmental theory that 
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applies to all persons this cultural bias must also be taken into 
account and eliminated. 
The purposes of this paper are to (1) present the basis and 
content of Kohlberg's theory and the arguments presented by 
Gilligan against it, (2) to examine Gilligan's counter-
hypothesis, (3) to examine methodological problems in both 
theories, (4) to evaluate some of the philosophical implications 
of the theories, (5) to discuss the effect of cultural bias, and 
(6) to suggest a different approach to constructing a uniform 
moral development theory. 
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MORAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 
Approaches to Moral Development Theory 
Moral development theory can be approached from several 
different viewpoints, and is commonly subdivided into four 
categories based on the viewpoint: 
(1) The cognitive-developmental structural approach--in 
which the development of reasoning capabilities parallels moral 
development and the emphasis is on the structure of the moral 
judgment rather than on its content. 
(2) The stage-structural constructivist approach--in which 
a sense of self-identity and a moral identity develop (are 
"constructed") together. 
( 3 ) The learning-behavioral development approach--in which 
moral behavior is learned directly from the words and deeds of 
others. 
( 4 ) The social-personality theory approach- - in which the 
interaction of feelings and learning within a culture give rise 
to mor a l development. 
In reality, moral development probably includes elements of 
al l these viewpoints, however, models tend to be built from a 
s ingle perspective. Kohlberg's model, which began its 
development in his 1958 doctoral dissertation, falls clearly into 
the cognitive-developmental structural approach (Kurtines and 
Gewirtz, 1984). Because the Kohlberg model is so widely applied 
as a measure of the "level" of moral development in psychological 
test subjects, it is this approach which will be studied in 
depth. Criticisms come from all four viewpoints and will be 
discussed as they apply to Kohlberg's model and cognitive-
developmental approaches in general. 
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The Cognitive-Development Approach 
According to Kohlberg (1984b), cognitive-development 
theories make the assumptions shown in Table 1: 
Table 1: Cognitive-Development Assumptions 
In general: 
( 1) Basic development 
involves changes in 
cognitive structure which 
cannot be explained as 
associationistic 
learning. 
(2) Development of cogniti v e 
structure is due to 
environmental 
interaction, not 
maturation or learnin g. 
( 3 ) Cognitive activities a re 
organized as actions upon 
objects. 
(4) Cognitive development i s 
toward balanced 
interactions between th e 
individual and an 
"other"--object, person, 
or idea. 
As applied to moral 
development: 
(1) Affective and cognitive 
development are parallel 
in time. 
(2) There is a fundamental 
unit of personality 
organization termed the 
ego, and social 
development is the 
restructuring of 
(a) the concept of self 
(b) relationship to 
concepts of other people 
(c) conception of being 
in a common social world 
with social standards. 
(3) The processes that change 
cognition are basic to 
social development. 
(4) The direction of social 
or ego development is 
toward balanced, 
reciprocal interactions 
between the individual 
and other individuals. 
In other words, cognitive-developmental moral theorists assume 
that cognitive development (and therefore moral development) is: 
(1) a physical reality--measurable and quantifiable 
(2) environmentally stimulated--not taught or intrinsically 
developed 
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(3) based on reciprocity of interaction, and 
(4) the smallest functional unit of socialization. 
The Kohlberg Model 
The Kohlberg model had its genesis with a longitudinal study 
of 84 white middle class males at age 10, 13, and 16 (Kohlberg, 
1958) . The boys were presented with hypothetical dilemmas and 
responded to questions based on the dilemmas in a one-on-one 
interview format. This method is still used today in what has 
become known as the "Kohlberg test." 
to include issues of life, law, 
The dilemmas are designed 
morality and conscience, 
punishment, contract, and authority (e.g. the organization of 
Colby and Kohlberg, 1987b). The content of the dilemmas are in 
Appendix A, and an example of the interview format are in 
Appendix B. 
Based on this interview data, Kohlberg developed a model 
claiming 
(1) Moral development (and therefore moral reasoning) 
progresses through stages. 
(2) The stages are universal. 
(3) The order of the stages is invariant--each stage builds 
logically upon the other so stage-skipping and stage-
regression are impossible. 
(4) The rate of moral development is a function of (a) the 
level of cognitive development, and (b) exposure to 
appropriate socializing experiences. 
(5) Each stage is more "moral" than its predecessor. 
The claims of the model have remained the same even though the 
definitions of the stages have changed. The current stage 
definition was established in 1976 and has been most recently 
described by Colby and Kohlberg (1987a:17-19) and evaluated by 
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Walker ( 1984) . 
follows: 
The hierarchical structure of the stages is as 
LEVEL 1: Preconventional--individualistic perspective 
STAGE 1: Heteronomous morality--right is determined by 
punishment and obedience. 
STAGE 2: Individualism, instrumental purpose and 
exchange--right is determined by those things 
which preserve the individual interests of 
all. 
LEVEL 2: Conventional--member-of-the-society perspective 
STAGE 3: Mutual interpersonal expectations, 
relationships and conformity--right is 
defined by the shared interests of others. 
STAGE 4: Social system and conscience--right is 
determined by those things which maintain 
social order and the welfare of society. 
LEVEL 3: Postconventional or principled--thought out in 
terms of self-chosen principles 
STAGE 5: Social contract or utility and individual 
rights--right is determined rights and values 
in a sort of utilitarian perspective. 
STAGE 6: Universal ethical principles--right is 
defined in accord with self-chosen, logically 
consistent principles that are abstract, 
ethical, universal and comprehensive. 
These stages of development strongly reflect Kohlberg's own 
definition of morality as "one involving issues of justice, that 
is a conflict of rights and claims," ( Kohl berg and Candee, 
1984) . Although Kohlberg defines morality somewhat more broadly 
(he follows Rawls, 1971), he measures a moral descision as one 
where a subject weighs the rights (e.g. right to life, right to 
property, right to honesty) of all persons involved in the 
situation and selects his or her action based on a hierarchical 
system of precedence. This rights-orientation (often labeled 
"justice-orientation" in the literature) is a major source of 
dispute over Kohlberg's theory. 
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As it is used today, the Kohlberg test is done in interview 
format, then the content of the subject's responses are analyzed 
using a standardized scoring manual (see Appendix c, also Colby 
and Kohlberg, 1987b). Subjects are assigned to a certain stage 
based on how well their responses fit with the types published in 
the scoring manual. Stage six has not been observed to develop 
in the longitudinal studies and is now considered to be purely 
theoretical (Kohlberg, 1982). It remains an important stage in 
theoretical considerations, however, because it is the logical 
extension of Kohlberg's entire theory. 
Gilligan's Critique 
Carol Gilligan, who began her moral development research 
working with Kohlberg, maintains the cognitive-developmental 
perspective. However, she was disturbed by the fact that women 
tended to score lower than men on the Kohlberg test. 
Influenced by Nancy Chodorow' s studies of gender identity 
(Chodorow, 1974 cited in Gilligan, 1979) which tied masculine 
identity to separation and individualization, and feminine 
identity to position within interpersonal relationships, Gilligan 
became critical of the increase in separation required for 
development in the Kohlberg model and Kohlberg' s relegation of 
concern for others to Stage 3 moral decision-making. 
(Gilligan 1982:9) that feminine identity becomes 
She noted 
not only a descriptive difference but also a developmental 
liability when the milestones of childhood and adolescent 
development in the psychological literature are markers of 
increasing separation. Women's failure to separate then 
becomes by definition a failure to develop. 
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Critical of the devaluation of connectedness to Kohlberg's 
Stage 3, Gilligan has presented 3 cross-sectional studies in her 
book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's 
Development (1982). 
studied 
Based on an open-ended interview format, she 
( 1) 2 5 students chosen at random from a sophomore ethics 
course at Radcliffe 
(2) 29 women considering abortions, and 
( 3) 144 males and females matched for age, intelligence, 
education, occupation and social class. 
Data from these interviews led her to define moral decisions as 
"the exercise of choice and the willingness to accept 
responsibility for that choice" (Gilligan, 1982: 67). Gilligan 
claimed she heard a "different voice" from people (mostly women) 
who looked at moral dilemmas from a more contextual, less rights-
oriented perspective. She noted the possibility that this voice 
falls through the cracks in the Kohlberg test and had gone mostly 
unnoticed. She hypothesized that since the formulation of 
Kohlberg' s original model had been based only on studies of 
middle-class males, an entirely separate model might be necessary 
to understand the development of other groups. To rectify this 
situation she used her own interview data to construct a 3-level 
"Ethic of Caring" to contrast with Kohlberg' s 6-level "Ethic of 
Justice." 
The ethic of caring is envisioned as a 3-step process with 
transition states precipitated by some sort of moral crisis 
(Gilligan, 1977) as follows: 
(1) Orientation to individual survival 
TRANSITION: From selfishness to responsibility 
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(2) Goodness as self-sacrifice 
TRANSITION: From goodness to truth 
(3) The morality of non-violence 
Following these three steps, Gilligan (1982:167) suggests a final 
gender-independent transition to "adulthood" where "starting from 
very different points, from the different ideologies of justice 
and care, the men and the women . come, in the course of 
becoming an adult, to a greater understanding of both points of 
view and thus to a greater convergence in judgment." Gilligan 
suggests that men and women begin from unique perspectives as a 
result of gender identity but are able at maturity to form a 
synthesis of contextual aspects of caring and objective aspects 
of justice in their moral lives. 
To summarize, Gilligan has proposed 
(1) A contextual relativistic viewpoint is as equally valid 
as a objective universalist viewpoint. 
(2) Sex-bias and possibly class or ethnic bias exists 
within the Kohlberg model. 
(3) Women proceed through different stages of moral 
development than do men. 
(4) Moral development in women is strongly influenced by a 
contextual relativistic viewpoint which is a result of 
genderization in the first years of life. 
(5) The Kohlberg model and the "Gilligan model" are simply 
different paths to the same destination, and that 
destination is actually a synthesis of the male and 
female perspectives in adulthood. 
Gilligan's data was obtained mostly from interviews from the 
women considering abortion, however, she has suggested a broader 
gender difference in actual moral development in addition to sex-
bias within the Kohlberg model. 
The issues of bias and separatism must be considered 
separately. A broader issue raised is the distinction of 
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relativistic and universalistic viewpoints and their role in 
morality. 
Gilligan (1986:330) does not claim that her limited research 
and hypotheses extend beyond the actual groups "in the advantaged 
populations that have been studied." However, other workers have 
begun to build on preliminaries and have agreed that modes of 
moral judgment might be due to terms of self-definition (Lyons, 
1983), and that a redefinition of Kohlberg's higher stages 
reverses at least some sex-bias (Murphy and Gilligan, 1980). 
Kohlberg himself has begun to include a certain level of caring 
in the definitions for his model, as is revealed by the switch 
from aspect scoring to issue scoring (See Appendix C). 
Scientific Methodology 
Response Bias. The research methods of both Kohlberg 
and Gilligan have been criticized as being "result-oriented"--
developed to get a specific result rather th a n empirical 
information. Such a bias can come when the interviewer asks 
questions in hopes of hearing an expected response or chooses 
only certain classes of subjects for study and will be termed 
"response bias." 
Weinrich-Haste (1984) has noted that interviews are 
unreliable means of getting information on a subject's moral 
thinking because 
( 1) an interview response can be situationally determined 
by 
(a) what the subject thinks the interviewer wants to 
hear, or 
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(b) what the subject thinks he or she should say based 
on a perceived role in society, and 
( 2) the interview questions are biased toward those who's 
means of moral expression matches the scoring system. 
Gilligan (1982:29,31) considers these criticisms in referring to 
the inability of the Kohlberg test to elicit responses from one 
of her subjects. 
As the interviewer conveys through the repetition of 
questions that the answers she gave were not heard or not 
right, Amy's confidence begins to diminish, and her replies 
become more constrained and unsure, . the interviewer's 
problem in understanding Amy's response stems from the fact 
that Amy is answering a different question from the one the 
interviewer thought had been posed. 
Gilligan's solution to the response bias she observes in 
Kohlberg's question format is to use a more open-ended interview 
format where no specific questioning sequence is prescribed. 
However, an open interview format, while presenting more 
opportunities for the subject's self-expression, also presents 
more opportunity for the interviewer to (consciously or 
unconsciously) force the discussion in a desired direction. As 
Nails ( 1983: 653) writes, "What would keep the interviewer from 
exploring one type, designating a stage to that type, and going 
on, satisfied, to other points without uncovering important 
evidence of other types of reasoning?" Clearly, Gilligan's 
solution only decreases the reliability of information obtained 
from interview responses. 
It is interesting that Kohlberg recommends his test be given 
in interview format because of the unreliability of scoring 
written questionnaires. Perhaps in the absence of interaction 
with an interviewer the subject feels more free to utilize 
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justice and non-justice oriented arguments jointly in making his 
or her decision. Such reasoning "compromises" results on the 
Kohl berg test, but may be more indicative of real-1 ife moral 
reasoning. 
Not only are Kohlberg and Gilligan both using an unreliable 
method for obtaining their data, but they are also guilty of poor 
sample selection practices. Kohlberg based his early theory 
construction on interviews with young middle class white males. 
The rest of his theory development has been "bootstrapping" 
(Flanagan, 1982a) --trying to modify the scoring manual so that 
responses by subjects of alternate race, social class, or sex 
would fit into his hierarchy. Such a sampling plus bootstrapping 
makes it impossible to search for the effects that bias within 
the original subjects or within Kohlberg himself might have had 
on his hierarchy because it effectively masks their presence 
without scientific justification. 
Gilligan, while critical of Kohlberg's all-male sample, 
bases much of her work on a small sample of women considering 
abortions. In her sample it is impossible to compare the 
reasoning of women and men in order to confirm or deny charges of 
sex-difference or sex-bias. Since men never get pregnant, they 
will have limited abilities to solve an abortion dilemma 
hypothetically. Even non-pregnant women or women with wanted 
pregnancies would look at the dilemma differently than the women 
in Gilligan's study. Gilligan errs in taking a very specific 
sample population (women with unwanted pregnancies) and expanding 
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her findings to encompass women in general. Furthermore, the 
abortion decision itself is one involving issues of relationships 
to fetus, father, family and self and would be expected to be 
discussed in terms of relationships rather than in terms of 
rights . Gilligan's abortion sample set is likely to indicate 
differences between women and men and moral issues of caring 
whether or not these are actually important for measuring moral 
development. 
Not only does the abortion dilemma make a "poor paradigm for 
the assessment of moral maturity" (Code, 1983:553) but Gilligan's 
other samples of college students and matched age groups also 
fail to be adequate samples from which to draw generalizable 
conclusions. College students at an expensive private university 
who take an elementary ethics course are not characteristic 
representatives of college students or their age group and as 
Luria ( 1986: 317) points out, "eight males and eight females at 
different ages do not make up a number significant to 
characterize all males and females." 
Much of Gilligan's claim of a separate morality rely on 
interviews from these limited samples, or even worse, 
juxtapositions of the content of interviews from the various 
sample sets without including age, class, education or other 
factors. Gilligan follows too closely in the footsteps of her 
former collaborator in that neither researcher's work shows 
evidence of adequate objective methods that would enable them to 
make any general claim at all. Unfortunately, Kohlberg has made 
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strong claims of the universality of his theory and Gilligan has 
spread her work thoroughly through popular psychology channels. 
Reporting methods. It must be mentioned that reporting 
methods (particularly those of Gilligan) have been questioned by 
numerous authors. It is possible that in reporting her findings 
she has distorted the degree to which they support her 
hypothesis. Some of these criticisms include: 
(1) mixing literary examples with empirical research 
(Luria, 1986) 
(2) omitting ellipses when abbreviating quotations from 
interviews (Nails, 1983) 
(3) not using an objective scoring system (Luria, 1986 
countered by Lyons, 1983), and 
( 4) claiming an "adult" synthesis of justice and caring 
perspectives without any real evidence ( Flanagan and 
Alder, 1983). 
Bias within the theories. The most extensive arguments 
catalyzed by the work of Kohlberg and Gilligan are arguments of 
bias. Charges have been raised regarding sex-, class-, 
education-, and philosophical bias. Nicholson (1983:515) 
summarizes the breadth of these arguments: 
Insofar as we talk about a feminine or masculine moral point 
of view, we run the risk of not seeing how what we are 
describing reflects the gender viewpoint of a certain race 
or class at a certain time. We thus tend to commit the same 
kind of error of false generalization that motivated the 
initial rebellion. 
Although Gilligan first charged sex-bias in Kohlberg's model 
in over ten years ago (Gilligan, 1977), the issue is currently 
far from being resolved. Many studies using Kohlberg' s rating 
system have found that women tended to remain at level 3 while 
men "more consistently mature to level 4" ( Greeno and Macoby, 
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1986). Is it true that women do not make the transition from the 
more personal Stage 3 to the societal Stage 4? 
A comprehensive review of studies using the Kohlberg test on 
men and women suggests the answer to this question may be "no" 
(Walker, 1984) . In this review, Walker states that a charge of 
sex-bias can only be warranted for two reasons: 
(1) If a theorist is popularizing a poorly founded claim of 
sex-difference in moral development, and 
(2) If a theorist defines and measures moral maturity in 
such a way that a difference in moral development is 
artificially created. 
Sex-bias of the first type is possible in Gilligan's work because 
of how widely popularized it has been in its preliminary stages, 
and sex-bias of the second type is possible in the work of either 
Gilligan or Kohlberg. 
Gilligan's work has already been shown to have an incomplete 
foundation but has been extremely popular among workers in many 
disciplines. Her work confirms a "feeling" shared by many in our 
culture. Greeno and Macoby (1986: 313) note that "women have a 
greater reputation for al truism and empathy than do men, and 
women accept its validity. " This reputation, however, is at 
least to some degree, a product of the history of our culture and 
has no business validating a psychological theory. Whether 
Gilligan intended it or not, her work is guilty of sex-bias of 
the first type because its preliminary nature has been overlooked 
as it is used as evidence of an inarguable difference in moral 
development between the sexes. 
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Kohlberg' s work, on the other hand, must stand up to the 
accusations of sex-bias of the second type. 
charge, Kohlberg must show that 
To respond to this 
(1) Women do not score lower than men on the Kohlberg test 
when other factors are matched or that women who do 
score lower on the test do so as a result of faulty 
development, and 
(2) No sex-bias has been introduced into his theory due to 
the fact that 
(a) Kohlberg is a man 
(b) his theory was constructed using men 
(c) male protagonists dominate his hypothetical 
dilemmas 
Walker ( 1984: 688) claims in his review that very few sex 
differences in moral development have been found." However, some 
of the exceptions to this conclusion are of note: 
(1) In early adolescence a few studies found that men and 
women with non-traditional sex role identities scored 
higher on the Kohlberg test (Arbuthnot, 1975 cited in 
Walker, 1984). 
(2) One study found that "women used more Stage 3 reasoning 
than men did on the standard dilemmas involving 
ficticious characters, whereas there were no sex 
differences on modified dilemmas" involving relatives 
or friends (Levine, 1976 cited in Walker, 1984:681). 
( 3 ) In studies of adults showing a sex difference in moral 
development "sex was often confounded with educational 
and/or occupational differences" (Walker, 1984:683). 
These exceptions suggest the abstract thinking necessary to do 
well on the Kohlberg test might be more common in persons with 
higher levels of education. An educational bias of this sort 
could masquerade as a se x -bias in a sample that included less-
educated "traditional" women and more-educated career-oriented 
men. 
Some studies could produce sex-bias in using the Kohlberg 
test simply by improperly correlating variables. Luria 
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(1986:319) has noted that in her work "when social class is truly 
controlled, that is by determining a married woman's class by her 
own education and work history rather than by her spouse's, sex 
differences do not appear." Thus, many reports of sex-bias could 
be due to improper use of the Kohlberg test rather than to flaws 
in the model itself. 
Because the Kohlberg test relies on vocal expression to 
determine a stage of development, another possible source of sex-
bias arises: perhaps women express themselves differently in 
articulating their reasoning about moral dilemmas. It is 
conceivable that the moral reasoning process could be similar in 
women and in men but that women do not use the appropriate "buzz 
words" in describing their reasoning and thereby score lower on 
the Kohlberg test. 
Kekes (1984) describes a list of terms denoting moral 
values* as "moral idioms." Moral idioms are provided by 
language, tradition and culture and different idioms are assigned 
different moral values in a given culture at a given time. 
culture acknowledging gender roles and class levels, 
In a 
it lS 
logical that moral idioms would have different values for members 
of different genders or classes. A difference in moral idiom 
could easily lead to a difference in moral expression and a 
subsequent difference in scoring on the Kohlberg test. However, 
*tor example "forthright, unassuming, generous, faithful, 
honourable, considerate, trustworthy, modest, courageous, honest, 
pure, conscientious, corrupt, cruel, treacherous, envious, petty, 
hypocritical, selfish, greedy, cowardly, overbearing, obsequious, 
arrogant" (Kekes, 1984:7). 
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a difference in idiom is primarily a function of culture, not of 
gender or class per se. 
Tronto (1987:649) suggests that 
Women's different moral expression might be a function of 
their subordinate or ten ta ti ve social position if 
moral difference is a function of social position rather 
than gender, then the morality Gilligan has identified with 
women might better be identified with subordinate or 
minority status. 
Formal education could be viewed as a process of introducing a 
more confident intellectual moral idiom into a person's 
expression. The more extensive the education of the subject, the 
better he or she would perform on the Kohl berg test. Because 
formal education includes on-going cognitive processes, "moral 
development" as measured on the Kohlberg scale would appear to be 
a parallel cognitive process. Such an educational bias would 
show the Kohlberg test to be merely an elaborate measure of the 
subject's ability to use moral idioms in describing responses to 
abstract dilemmas, and would say little about the state of the 
subject's "moral development." Supporting the possibility of 
educational bias in the Kohlberg model is the fact that subjects 
with degrees in philosophy score as a Kohlberg Stage 5 or 6 
regardless of their sex or other variables (Flanagan, 1982a}. 
It appears that the Kohlberg test is not a direct measure of 
moral development but rather a attempt to arbitrarily quantify 
moral development without considering such variables as race, 
class, culture, or sex. In some research it may perform 
adequately for certain needs as long as its limitations are 
carefully considered and it is not the only measure used. 
19 
However, even if the Kohlberg test were shown to have no 
sex-, class-, education-, or culture-bias (which is almost 
impossible), proof that there are no biases in the Kohlberg model 
does not preclude differences in moral development between the 
groups. Kohlberg is caught in a Catch 22: if his theory shows a 
difference in development between the groups, he cannot prove its 
validity because of its questionable origins; if it does not show 
a difference between groups it has told us very little about 
moral development. 
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THE APPLICATION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
Thus far, the issues of moral development discussed have 
been primarily research-oriented--considering such topics as 
interview methods, sample set, reporting methods and bias. These 
methodological subjects are only a part of the concerns that must 
be addressed when considering the work of Kohlberg and Gilligan. 
Since both researchers come from the cognitive-developmental 
school of thought, they share a series of assumptions about the 
underlying nature of moral development and these assumptions must 
be examined. 
Cognitive-developmental theories make a claim to 
univer s ality--a claim that because morality is tied to cognitive 
develo pment, moral development is definable independent of 
c ultur e . Therefore, it is also important to discuss the effects 
of Wes tern culture on the development of these theories, and the 
limitations that this tradition places on claims of universality. 
The Cognitive Developmental Perspective 
A review of the definitions and assumptions of the 
cognitive-developmental perspective, listed in section II-A 
suggests a series of basic questions that must be answered before 
adopting this theoretical perspective. Words such as cognitive, 
development, structure, and content carry with them implicit 
assumptions to be addressed. 
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Is morality a 
developmental approach 
cognitive process? The cognitive-
assumes that moral development parallels 
cognitive development because 
moral dilemmas an individual 
objective ideal. 
in the process of thinking about 
expands and builds toward an 
A possible flaw in founding any moral development theory on 
cognitive development is indicated by the fact that adolescents 
and adults are known to have "mature cognition," but the morality 
of adolescents and adults is distinctly different (Murphy and 
Gilligan, 198 0) . Kohlberg argues that cognitive development and 
experience play a role in moral development and that adolescents 
might show inferior development due to lack of appropriate 
experiences. However, Kohlberg has not generally defined the 
experiences that are lacking and it is easy to think of examples 
of adolescents who have had a wide range of "adult" experiences 
and do not show the moral discernment characteristic of 
Kohlberg's higher stages. A specific hypothetical example is the 
case of a middle-class drug-addicted teenage runaway who has a 
"don't hurt me and I won't hurt you" morality (Kohlberg Stage 2). 
This individual may have had a wide range of caring, educational, 
and leadership experienced but may be choosing a separate 
morality due to the necessities of life on the street. 
Kohlberg's model fails to account for the individual's choice to 





first described regressions among 
Cramer) and argued that it was 
adults in 1969 
a "functional 
regression resulting from an adolescent identity crisis" (Murphy 
and Gilligan, 1980). He later reconsidered and asserted that 
adult experiences of commitment and responsibility triggered 
development to higher stages. Such an assertion (which has 
remained unsubstantiated in longitudinal studies) does not 
preclude the possibility that religious belief, societal 
position, or peer pressure could have larger roles in moral 
development than cognition or experiences in independence do. 
Cognitive-developmental theories do not take into account 
the possibility of a person rejecting a "stage" of development 
that is understood. For example, although Gilligan maintains a 
cognitive-developmental approach, her data could just as easily 
imply that women perceive an ethic of rights but choose an ethic 
of responsibility. Kohlberg (1984a:19 3 ) maintains that each of 
his stages builds upon and supercedes the other and that each 
stage is more "morally right" than the last. This, when coupled 
with his statement that individuals "prefer the highest stage 
they comprehend" (Kohlberg, 1973: 633) is clearly a romanticized 
view of human nature as a whole. 
The assumption that cognitive 
environmental stimulus only--not 
development is 
to more formal 
due to 
learning 
processes-- may be acceptable in description of mental faculty, 
however, it becomes a major flaw when cognitive development is 
coupled to moral development. The previous discussion of 
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cultural bias in Kohlberg's theory illustrates this point because 
"culture" is a combination of environment and formalized 
learning. 
Morality is a cognitive process in the general sense that a 
person thinks about moral issues in making moral choices. 
However, morality is not a cognitive process in the limited sense 
used by cognitive-developmental theorists. It cannot be directly 
and irrevocably coupled to environmental stimulation exclusive of 
associationistic learning. 
How should we measure morality? In evaluating individual 
morality by the currently used methods it is important to 
remember that cognitive skills (such as self-expression, 
imagin a tion, and abstract thinking) are directly measured whereas 
moral thinking is intuitively extrapolated from this measure. As 
Nails (1983:660) points out, "A distortion in the present 
conception of moral maturity is that it is measured by examining 
a persons words without attention to his or her moral deeds . " 
The fact that cognition, not moral thinking, is directly 
measured explains the educational bias present in Kohlberg's 
theory. The extrapolation process explains why the researcher's 
cultural, gender, and philosophical biases are difficult to 
eliminate from the analysis of data. 
Morality can be measured in several ways: 
(1) indirectly by form--the way a subject expresses himself 
about moral issues 
(2) indirectly by content--the issues the subject considers 
to be important 
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( 3) directly by action--the actual moral choices made by 
the subject 
(4) by a combination of 1,2, and 3 
Kohlberg's scoring method has gradually shifted from evaluating 
form to evaluating content (Appendix C). Gilligan's open-
interview format primarily evaluates content. Neither researcher 
incorporates the subject's moral actions into a description of 
their moral status--Kohlberg because his hypothetical format 
prevents such incorporation, and Gilligan because she does not 
consider it to be necessary. 
Gilligan (1982) notes that in her abortion study a majority 
of participants stated at some point in the interview that 
abortion was morally wrong. However, of the 27 women interviewed 
after 1 year, only 4 continued their pregnancy. This discrepancy 
between thinking and doing does not concern Gilligan because she 
wants to illustrate the contextual nature of the women's thought. 
The women choose something "wrong" because other factors outweigh 
its "wrongness." 
For the same contextual reasons, Gilligan claims that two 
individuals facing similar moral dilemmas may make different 
choices based on the context in which they make the choices. 
This subjectivistic perspective had been previously labeled 
"postconventional contextual" as opposed to "postconventional 
formal" which uses concepts of rights and contracts (Murphy and 
Gilligan 1980:83). The label "postconventional contextual," 
however, conceals the philosophical underpinnings of contextual 
relativism. 
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In adopting a contextual relativistic viewpoint, Gilligan 
dismisses actions which may be paradoxical or contradictory as 
justifiable. She suggests that this is a sort of Rossian 
projection 
only prima 
from a rule to an exception: "that rules are valid 
facie if there are no other moral considerations" 
(Ross, 1930 cited in Nunner-Winkler, 1984:352). However, in this 
case the rule is "do what you think is right" and the exception 
is "do what you want by contextual justification" which is hardly 
the fulfillment of a duty envisioned by Ross. Relativistic 
arguments cannot be used to justify the actions of a subject who 
does not adopt relativism as a moral system (and Gilligan's 
subjects are clearly not relativists if they state that 
something--abortion--is "wrong"). 
Because people do not always do what they believe is the 
"right" thing, and because the weighing of other subjective 
factors plays a role in moral choice, cognitive-developmental 
theories fail to describe morality--they are limited by their 
failure to incorporate action. If two individuals consider the 
same issues in the same way but make entirely different choices, 
not only is the morality of these two individuals ditferent in 
general, but their moral development is also different. The 
subject's choice to maintain or abandon his or her determination 
of "right" is a crucial indication of moral development. 
The Definition of Morality 
Indirect measurement methods are compromised by the 
necessity of extrapolation. The way that cognitive data is 
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translated into a stage or level reflects the researcher's choice 
of philosophical perspective. 
Kohlberg labels his higher stages as follows (Kohlberg 
1982:525): 
4 \ : ethical egoism 
5: rule utilitarianism 
6: deontological contractualism. 
He suggests that "classical normative-ethical theories have some 
degree of correspondence to a 'natural' stage sequence" of 
development in the individual. Although his argument is 
elaborate (see Kohlberg, 1984a:97-226) he fails to recognize that 
the "classical normative-ethical theories" have evolved within 
the historical context of the Western world and are not 
necessarily evidence of the universality of his model for 
individual development. 
That Kohlberg would seek a "historical" development of 
thought in the individual and label it "natural" illustrates that 
his theory is confined within the tradition in which it was 
developed. Kohlberg measures moral development by indirectly by 
recording culturally-based moral idioms so it is no surprise that 
Kohlberg's model produces culturally biased data. The fact that 
the model mimics the development of thought in a single culture 
becomes an illustration of this cultural bias. 
Gilligan's description of a morality of rights versus a 
morality of relationships is actually a contention of objectivity 
versus subjectivity in morality. This parallels the current 
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controversy in western thought. As Kurtines and Gewirtz 
(1984:21) note, "the question of the existence 
of an objective foundation for ethics or morality is one of the 
central issues in the history of ideas in the modern age." 
The debate over an objective ethical foundation spills over 
into the definition of moral development. For example, the 
rights versus responsibility issue reflects the broader 
philosophical issue of objective versus subjective good. Whether 
to count "the good life" among moral considerations reflects the 
confusion caused by a surge in scientific relativism. Major 
philosophical arguments as applied to moral development theory 
with references are listed in Appendix D. 
Since an objective moral standard has not yet been 
determined, it is dangerous for a researcher to arbitrarily 
select a standard on which to build a theory. It is misleading 
for that researcher to then apply that theory as if it were 
objective and universal, yet this is exactly what Kohlberg and 
Gilligan have both done. Instead, a theory should be developed 
that attempts to acount for culture and education as additional 
variables. 
Any moral theory embedded in Western culture and current 
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controversy is questionable. It is possible, however, to step 
away from these cultural biases and develop an objective moral 
development theory. 
way to remove the 
The next section of this paper suggests a 
philosophical bias from research in moral 
development by adopting a different type of "developmental" 
model. 
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AN ALTERNATIVE: DEVELOPMENT VERSUS MODIFICATION 
Kohlberg's theory can be schematically represented as a 
linear process in time: 
1 ➔ 2 ➔ 3 ➔ 4 ➔ s c ➔ 6). 
Gilligan claims a parallel but separate development for some 
persons and can similarly be represented: 
adult, 
1 ➔ 2 ➔ 3 /' 
also as a process in time. She criticizes Kohlberg's assumption 
that "there is a single mode of social experience and 
interpretation" (Gilligan, 1982:173) and proposes a second mode. 
Kohlberg' s claim to a single mode of development has been 
clearly called into question by the cultural bias of his theory. 
On the other h a nd, no evidence has ever indicated that there 
should be a finite number of developmental modes. As Nicholson 
(1983:533) queries, "Why do we need to limit our understanding to 
the recognition of only two modes?" 
Kohlberg's theory describes middle-class white American 
males, Gilligan's hypothesis (questionably) describes middle-
class white American women. There is no empirical reason that 
these developmental processes should or could be applied to other 
cultures, economic classes, or time periods. With the limited 
nature of current research (data from past generations and other 
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cultures is unfortunately scarce), a more appropriate conception 
of moral "development" is as a web of interactions. 
Such a web would replace "stages" with "junctions" where 
morality had been described. "Transitions "--movements from one 
junction to another could proceed in several directions based on 
the interactions of the individual with his environment and other 
individuals, 
development. 
associationistic learning, choice, and cognitive 
The identity of the junctions must be defined by a 
combination of thought and action. The nature of the transitions 
must be described independent of the moral judgment of the 
researchers--a transition must not be labeled as an improvement 
or regression. 
The concept that morality "develops" can only be accurately 
applied to the individual. For a single person, moral 
development could be represented as a linear progression or a 
series of loops. However, if a universal picture of moral 
development is desired, it must take into account many different 
influences. This universal picture is poorly described by the 
use of the word "development" because of its connotation of a 
linear progression. As long as the variables of culture, 
education, and choice have a role in morality and cannot be 
separated from it, changes in moral perspective are better 
described as moral "modifications". Moral modifications may or 
in the direction approved by a given may not proceed 
philosophical theory so it their definition and measuring is 
independent of philosophical bias. 
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Although the concept of a web of moral modifications is not 
the neat linear model that would be preferred by developmental 
psychologists, it is realistic and objective given the data 
currently available. The web model described avoids interpretive 
bias and does not ignore factors such as culture and education. 
It is only from such an unbiased perspective that a universal 
theory can be described. 
Psychomoral theory today is at a stage analogous to biology 
at the time of Linnaeus. It is still a time of description and 
determining binary relationships. Just as early biological 
taxonomists observed organisms around them and noted basic 
differences between individuals and groups, so "moral 
taxonomists" should try and describe the many modes of thinking 
and the factors initiating particular transitions. Given a large 
quantity of observational data, moral taxonomists could then 
determine differences bet ween groups. The major differen c es 
between groups would indi c ate the cultural and educational 
factors that are currently so difficult to discern. 
Finally, these factors could be stripped away from 
individual histories of moral modification to reveal a truly 




This paper began with the current controversy over sex-bias 
in moral development theories. In examining arguments of 
scientific methodology, it was found that cultural and 
educational bias prevented the theories from being truly 
objective. In examining arguments of moral philosophy, it was 
found that this cultural bias was a product of the theorists' 
reliance on moral idioms common to our cultural tradition. 
Finally, a more realistic and objective perspective for the 
modeling of moral development / modification was suggested as a 
possible solution to the problem of bias. 
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Appendix A: Kohlberg's Nine DilemIDas in Brief 
Statements of each dilemma as it is currently used 
(Kohlberg, 1984b: 640-651) are listed. In interview use each 
statement is followed by a series of questions designed to 
determine the subject's reasoning and moral type. Some of the 
dilemmas are then extended with further questions. Appendix B 
lists the Heinz dilemma with the set questions. The 1984 
revision rearranged the sequence of the dilemmas to III, I, IV, 
II, V, VIII, and VII. For a complete listing of questions and 
extensions of all of the dilemmas see Kohlberg (1984b). 
Dilemma I: 
Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp 
very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved 
up the money for himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper 
route and saved up the forty dollars it cost to go to camp, 
and a little more besides. But just before camp was going 
to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends 
decided to go an a special fishing trip, and Joe's father 
was short of the money it cost. So he told Joe to give him 
the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't 
want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to 
give his father the money. 
Dilemma II: 
Judy was a twelve-year-old girl. Her mother promised 
her that she could go to a special rock concert coming to 
her town if she saved up from babysitting and lunch money to 
buy a ticket to the concert. She managed to save up the 
fifteen dollars the ticket cost plus another five dollars. 
But then her mother changed her mind and told Judy that she 
had to spend the money on new clothes for school. Judy was 
disappointed and decided to go to the concert anyway. She 
bought a ticket and told her mother she had only been able 
to save five dollars. That Saturday she went to the 
performance and told her mother that she was spending the 
day with a friend. A week passed without her mother finding 
out. Judy then told her older sister, Louise, that she had 
gone to the performance and had lied to her mother about it. 
Louise wonders whether to tell her mother what Judy did. 
Dilemma III: The Heinz Dilemma 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind 
of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought 
might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in 
the same town had recently discovered. The drug was 
expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times 
what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium 
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and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick 
woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow 
the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get 
together about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He 
told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to 
sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist 
said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money 
from it. 11 So, having tried every legal means, Heinz gets 
desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to 
steal the drug for his wife. 
Dilemma IV: 
There was a woman who had very bad cancer, and there 
was no treatment known to medicine that would save her. Her 
doctor, Dr. Jefferson, knew that she had only about six 
months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so 
weak that a good dose of a painkiller like morphine would 
make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy 
with pain, but in her calm periods she would ask Dr. 
Jefferson to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said 
she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die in a 
few months anyway. Although he knows that mercy-killing is 
against the law, the doctor thinks about granting her 
request. 
Dilemma V: 
In Korea, a company of Marines was way outnumbered and 
was retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a 
bridge over a river, but the enemy were mostly still on the 
other side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew it 
up, with the head start the rest of the men in the company 
would have, they would probably escape. But the man who 
stayed back to blow up the bridge would not be able to 
escape alive. The captain himself is the man who knows best 
how to lead the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no one 
will volunteer. If he goes himself, the men will probably 
not get back safely and he is the only one who knows how to 
lead the retreat. 
Dilemma VII: 
Two young men, brothers, had got into serious trouble. 
They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. 
Karl, the older one, broke into a store and stole a thousand 
dollars. Bob, the younger one, went to a retired old man 
who was known to help people in town. He told the man that 
he was very sick and that he needed a thousand dollars to 
pay for an operation. Bob asked the old man to lend him the 
money and promised that he would pay him back when he 
recovered. Really Bob wasn't sick at all, and he had no 
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intention of paying the man back. Although the 
didn't know Bob very well, he lent him the money. 




In a country in Europe, a poor man named Valjean could 
find no work, nor could his sister and brother. Without 
money, he stole food and medicine that they needed. He was 
captured and sentenced to prison for six years. After a 
couple of years, he escaped from the prison and went to live 
in another part of the country under a new name. He saved 
money and slowly built up a big factory. He gave his 
workers the highest wages and used most of the profits to 
build a hospital for people who couldn't afford good medical 
care. Twenty years had passed when a tailor recognized the 
factory owner as being Valjean, the escaped convict whom the 
police had been looking for back in his home town. 
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Appendix B: The Heinz Dilemma 
The dilemma with associated questions and extensions 
(Kohlberg, 1984b: 640-642) are listed here as an example of the 
format of the Kohlberg test and also as a means of directly 
evaluating the content of the Heinz dilemma. Only those 
questions which are scorable are listed. Those questions with an 
asterisk are considered by Kohlberg to be optional. For the 1984 
scoring method as it applies to the Heinz dilemma, see Appendix 
C. 
Dilemma III: 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind 
of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought 
might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in 
the same town had recently discovered. The drug was 
expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times 
what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium 
and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick 
woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow 
the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get 
together about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He 
told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to 
sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist 
said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money 
from it." So, having tried every legal means, Heinz gets 
desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to 
steal the drug for his wife. 
1. Should Heinz steal the drug? 
la. Why or why not? 
*2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the 
drug? 
*2a. Why is it right or wrong? 
3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug? 
3a. Why or why not?" 
4. If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the 
drug for her? (If subject favors stealing ask: Does 
it make a difference in what Heinz should do whether of 
not he loves his wife?) 
4a. Why or why not? 
5. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a 
stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the 
stranger? 
5a. Why or why not? 
*6. (If subject favors stealino the drug for a stranger) 
Suppose it's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal 
to save the pet animal? 
*6a. Why or why not? 
7. Is it important for people to do everything they can to 
save another's life? 
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7a. Why or why not? 
*8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that 
make it morally wrong? 
*8a. Why or why not? 
9. In general, should people try to do everything they can 
to obey the law? 
9a. Why or why not? 
9b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do? 
*10. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say 
is the most responsible thing for Heinz to do? 
*l0a. Why? 
Dilemma III': 
Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and 
gave it to his wife. In the newspapers the next day there 
was an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police officer 
who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered seeing 
Heinz running away from the store and realized that it was 
Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he 
should report that it was Heinz who stole the drug. 
*l. Should Officer Bro wn report Heinz for stealing? 
*la. Why or why not? 
*2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz, 
should he then report him? 
*2a . Why or why not? 
Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and 
brought to court. A jury was selected. The jury's job is 
to find whether a person is innocent or guilty of committing 
a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the 
judge to determine the sentence. 
3. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence, or should he 
suspend the sentence and let Heinz go free? 
3a. Why is that best? 
4. Thinking in terms of society, should people who break 
the law be punished? 
4a. Why or why not? 
4b. How does this apply to how the judge should decide? 
5. Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when he 
stole the drug. Should a lawbreaker be punished if he 
is acting out of conscience? 
5a. Why or why not? 
*6. Thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is 
the most responsible thing for the judge to do? 
*6a. Why? 
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Appendix C: Scoring the Heinz Dilemma 
The former scoring method, "aspect scoring", has been 
abandoned in favor of "intuitive issue scoring." Aspect scoring 
is based upon the subject's mode of reasoning about the issue 
while intuitive issue scoring is based upon what the individual 
is valuing. Kohlberg (1984b) claims intuitive issue scoring is 
the most valid method of scoring since it can be used to analyze 
any moral dilemma. Kohlberg' s ( 1984b: 192) own scorers have 
achieved 90% interrater agreement, however, intuitive scoring is 
difficult to apply on a wide basis because personal teaching and 
hands-on experience are required to produce replicable results. 
The new scoring manual (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987b), based on the 
issue scoring method, has attempted to standardize issue scoring 
into a format where sentences obtained in an interview are 
matched to prototypical sentences of each stage. 
Intuitive issue scoring is based upon eleven issues or 
values listed by Kohlberg (1984b:189-190): 
(1) Laws and rules 
(2) Conscience 
(3) Personal roles of affection 
(4) Authority 
(5) Civil rights 
(6) Contract, trust, and justice in exchange 
(7) Punishment and justice 
(8) The value of life 
(9) Property rights and values 
(10) Truth 
(11) Sex and se xual love 
Stage thinking is then defined for each issue and dilemmas 
c ategorized by the issues involved. The Heinz dilemma involves 
issue (8). The intuitive scoring of the Heinz dilemma is 
summarized below and can be found in Kohlberg (1984b:190-191). 
STAGE 1: Does not indicate an understanding that life is worth 
STAGE 2: 
more than property. 
Life is valuable because you cannot replace it; you can 
replace propert y . 
STAGE 3: Life is valuable because people care for others in 
their lives. 
STAGE 4: Life is valuable 
valuable because 
society. 
STAGE 5: The Right to Life 
Property. 
because 
it is a 
God created it; or life is 
basic right of people in a 
takes precedence over the Right to 
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Appendix D: Philosophical Criticisms 
of Moral Development Theory 
Some major topics of philosophical dispute are listed here. 
Almost every paper in the References section contains some type 
of philosophical argument. Additional sources listed here are 
those which were consulted and have not been cited above. 
The definition of morality: 
Keller, 1984 
Wolf, 1982 








Rights vs. relationships: 
Hardwing, 1984 
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